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ABSTRACT 
 
Do populist rule lead to more politicization? As populists have had electoral success in many coun-
tries in recent years, populism has received much attention both in the public debate and in political 
science. One aspect of the concept, how populists act once in power and how they relate to the state 
bureaucracy has however, so far, received only little attention. Populists have been suggested to in-
crease the politicization of the public bureaucracy, i.e. the degree of political involvement in the ca-
reers of bureaucrats, as populists are untrusting of the establishment and seek to increase their control 
of the state. This paper uses time-series cross-section data from Europe and Latin America to test 
whether populists increase politicization more than others when in power. The results show a positive 
relationship between populist rule and politicization; however, the effect seems to be driven mainly 
by a few cases of populists on the fringes of the left-right spectrum. Previous research has found that 
systems characterized by intense politicization are less resistant to corruption and preform worse on 
good governance indicators. Therefore, these results indicate that the current populist wave may have 
hidden implications for the bureaucratic performance of the effected countries. 
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Introduction 
Do populists increase the politicization of recruitment to the bureaucracy when they come into 
power? There are examples that suggests that they would. In Hungary, Prime Minister Orbán’s pop-
ulist Fidesz party has undertaken extensive reforms of the state bureaucracy. Including increasing the 
Prime Minister’s power to make appointments to the central administration, a power the government 
has been accused of using to politicize the bureaucracy, filling it with politically loyal civil servants 
(Bauer & Becker, 2020; Hajnal & Csengodi, 2014). Similarly, in the US, President Trump has been 
accused of using political appointments more extensively than his predecessors and reassigning “un-
reliable” bureaucrats to peripheral positions (Bauer & Becker, 2020; Peters & Pierre, 2019) And in 
Sweden, the Sweden democrats have, at the municipal level, been accused of blurring the line between 
politics and the bureaucracy (Aftonbladet, 2020). A defining feature of populism is the division be-
tween the good people and the corrupt elite and the goal of populists is to empower the people by taking 
control of the state and substituting the influence of the elite on the state’s institutions and policies 
with that of the people. Populists are majoritarian and believe that the will of the majority should 
have free rein and influence all matters of the state. Therefore, they are expected to try to increase 
the level of politicization when in power as they believe that even the bureaucracy should be subject 
to direct political control. Populists mistrust the bureaucracy whose pluralist ideals run counter to 
those of populism. Populists will try to change the bureaucracy by replacing its members with their 
own loyalists in order to increase their control and implement institutional change. The pluralistic 
bureaucracy’s attempts to uphold its traditional ideals in the face of a populist government is likely 
to be regarded as resistance which may increase politicization efforts even more.  
Politicization of the bureaucracy means that political criteria rather than merit becomes the norm of 
recruitment to the bureaucracy (Peters & Pierre, 2004:2). Political appointments can be a means of 
keeping the bureaucracy accountable to the public but if it becomes the norm for hiring personal in 
general it has been suggested to lead to loss of competence as more qualified candidates are passed 
over by politically loyal ones (Peters & Pierre, 2004, 2019; Lewis, 2008). This can reduce the effec-
tiveness of the bureaucracy, hurt its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and diminish the government’s 
ability to implement policy (Peters & Pierre, 2004:4; Moynihan & Roberts, 2010; Meyer-Sahling & 
Jager, 2012). Further, politicization has been said to alter the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats, which may expose bureaucrats to pressure from politicians to bend the rules or engage 
in corruption (Miller, 2000). In a politicized bureaucracy the careers of politicians and bureaucrats 
become linked, while the opposite, a professional bureaucracy separates their careers and sets up 
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different chains of accountability (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017). This separation of careers has been 
said to deter illicit behaviour in both groups and has been associated with higher quality of govern-
ment, lower levels of corruption, higher bureaucratic performance and better conditions for private 
business (Dahlström et al. 2012; Miller, 2000; Meyer-Sahling et al., 2018; Charron et al., 2016; Nisto-
tskaya & Cingolani, 2016).  
Populism has attracted increased interest in recent years, much as a result of populist parties having 
electoral success in Europe, governing in, Hungary, Poland, Italy and elsewhere, breaking new ground 
in places like Sweden and Germany as well as making the presidential run-offs in France. And in the 
Americas countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and more recently the US and Brazil have 
seen populist presidents. In political science, interest in populism has among other things been con-
cerned with explaining populism as a political phenomenon (Mudde, 2004, Mudde & Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2012, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2017) and its effect on democratic institutions (Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2012; Levitsky & Loxton, 2013; Hubert & Schimpf, 2016; Houle & Kenny, 2018; Ruth, 2018, 
Ruth-Lovell et al., 2019). There has also been ample attention payed to politicization as a phenome-
non as well as its potential effects (Peters & Pierre, 2004; Lewis, 2008; Dahlström et al., 2012; Miller, 
2000; Meyer-Sahling et al., 2018; Charron et al., 2016; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016).  
How populists actually govern when in power and how they relate to the bureaucracy however, has 
remained unexplored. Only recently has there been contributions that have begun to examine this 
link (Peters & Pierre, 2019:1524; Rockman, 2019; Bauer & Becker, 2020). These works have however, 
largely been focused on developing theory and producing expectations about the effect populist rul-
ers may have on the bureaucracy. Beyond observations about individual cases there has been no 
empirical test of populism’s relationship to the bureaucracy and whether populists in power increase 
politicization more than others. 
In this paper I examine populism’s effect on the bureaucracy and provide an empirical test of this 
relationship by combining data on populists in power and politicization using two new dataset, both 
which has become available only in the last year. One covers the tenures of populists in power in 
Europe and Latin America between 1995 and 2018 (Ruth-Lovell et al., 2019) and the other consists 
of expert survey data on the level of politicization from the Varieties of democracy project (Pemstein 
et al., 2020). I also examine whether different ideological strains of populism have different effects. 
Even though populism has a long history there has been relatively few cases of populists in govern-
ment. Now however, with the developments in Latin America and Europe over the last 25 years 
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there are, for the first-time sufficient cases and complied data to empirically test this relationship 
across the two continents that has been the most affected by populism so far. By combining this new 
data on populists and politicization, this paper offers a unique opportunity to empirically examine 
the relationship between populist rule and politicization.  
Overall, my analysis shows a positive relationship between populists in power and the level of polit-
icization. The results are in line with the theoretical expectations among scholars which has previously 
not been tested. However, the analysis of the different direct effects of populists’ ideological leanings 
suggests that the effect is driven by a few cases of populist actors on the fringes of the left-right 
spectrum. This warrants some caution in interpreting the results, as for most cases the pattern is less 
evident. Nevertheless, these results suggest that, as populist actors gain political influence in more 
and more countries, scholars, policy makers and citizens, need to pay attention to the developments 
of the norms that govern the public bureaucracy. Over time, populist rule may change the norms that 
has dominated most modern bureaucracies and replace them with more direct political control and 
put politics over merit. This could weaken the affected political systems resistance to corruption and 
reduce their quality of government.  
The next chapter defines the paper’s central concepts and lay out the theoretical expectations. After 
this I elaborate my research problem and present my hypothesises. This is followed by the methods 
section where I describe the data and statistical techniques used. After this I present the results which 
are then discussed in a separate chapter. The last chapter offers some conclusions and suggestions 
for further research.  
 
Theory  
Populism as a political phenomenon has a long history, one of the earliest examples are the American 
populist movement of the nineteenth century, which challenged the two-party system seeking to unite 
the interests of rural agrarian people against the economic and political elites (Rooduijn, 2014; Urbi-
nati, 2019). A populist who was early to hold power was Argentina’s Juan Perón who have been 
followed by many other populist leaders in Latin America, most recent is the wave of left-wing pop-
ulists that started with Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. In Europe, populism has mainly been associated 
with the political right, from neo-liberals such as the early Progress party in Denmark, to nationalists 
such as the National Front in France. The 2016 election of President Trump in the US, the Brexit 
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referendum and the rise of populist parties in many European countries has contributed to making 
populism one of the most talked about and important political concepts today (Thomson, 2017; 
Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Mudde; 2019). Having often been used as a derogatory term 
about political policies and opponents deemed as un-serious (Mudde 2004: 542-3), today there is even 
a strong movement, particularly on the left, of self-identifying populists (Mouffe, 2018; Venizelos & 
Stavrakakis, 2020). In the following sections I present definitions of populism and politicization and 
ley out the arguments and theoretical expectations about why populists are expected to increase po-
liticization when in power.  
 
Defining Populism 
Populism can take on many different forms, in the media and every-day conversation the term has 
been used very broadly and about a variety of different phenomenon (see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwas-
ser, 2017:1-5). This can give the impression of a word that, while surrounded by buzz and dark skies, 
has little meaning. In the political science literature, there has at times been just as much incon-
sistency, as there has been many different attempts to define populism (Rooduijn, 2014; Canovan, 
1981; Ionesco & Gellner, 1969; Laclau, 1977). The task of defining the term has even been called 
“defining the undefinable” (Mudde, 2004:523) and scholars have disagreed on what it is and whether 
to regard is as an ideology, a discourse, a movement, a style of politics or something else (Mudde, 
2004; Rooduijn, 2014).  
Today, one of the most widely accepted views of populism is the so-called ideational approach, that 
is, populism as a set of ideas (Mudde, 2017; Rooduijn et al., 2014). It is an attempt at a non-normative 
definition that does not make assumptions about populism’s relationship to democracy, can be in-
clusive and useful for comparisons and can travel across contexts (Mudde, 2017; Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2012; Urbinati, 2019). Here, I define populism using one of the most accepted definitions within the 
ideational approach, it comes from Cas Mudde and defines populism as: 
 “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homoge-
neous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general 
will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004:543 italics original).  
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This minimalistic definition is useful as it allows for the inclusion of populist actors of different 
ideological leanings and across both time and space, united by these core characteristics. At the same 
time, it separates out those who are not populist. Traditional parties and others who sometimes use 
populistic discourse but do not hold the people-elite conflict as their main concern are left out of the 
definition.  
Being a “thin-centred ideology” populism can be combined with other full ideologies such as social-
ism or nationalism, but in itself, populism is neither left nor right (Mudde, 2004, 2017:30). Central to 
populism is the conflict between the people and the elite, populism is moralistic and regards the 
difference between the people and the elite as a normative one where the elite have allowed them-
selves to be corrupted and betrayed the pure people (Mudde, 2004, 2017:30).  
Exactly who the elite and the people are can vary with different strains of populism, nativist populists 
may have a more exclusionary ethnic definition while socialist populists may employ a more inclu-
sionary class-based definition. Regardless, the two groups are always defined in opposition to each 
other. According to Mudde (2004) populists have a majoritarian understanding of democracy as well 
as a Manichean outlook, meaning that to them everything is either black or white, friend or foe. 
Populists see themselves as the only true representatives of the popular will, therefore, political op-
ponents may be seen as illegitimate as, in the eyes of the populists, they make false claims about 
representing the people and the popular will. Jaroslaw Kaczyński, leader of the Polish populist Law 
and Justice party (PiS) statements about his critics as traitors and “Poles of the worst sort” (Müller, 
2016:45) can serve as a perhaps slightly extreme example of this dichotomous antagonistic view of 
opponents. 
 
Politicization 
Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (2004) have defined politicization of the bureaucracy as:  
“the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, re-
tention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service” 
(2004: 2). 
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The “political criteria” can differ in its expression, in some cases it might mean party membership, in 
others it may be about loyalty to the government’s programs, its leader or ideology (Peters & Pierre, 
2004:2, 2019). According to the authors the term implies attempts to assert influence and control 
public policy and its implementation. Politicization is part of almost all political systems today but 
there are large differences between countries in regard to how much influence politicians have over 
appointments and the degree to which the political or merit-based criteria are employed (Kopecký et 
al., 2016; Dahlström et al., 2012). In some countries, politically motivated appointments are common 
at all levels of the bureaucracy, in others they are only used for higher level positions such as agency 
heads and in others they are rarer still. As politicians are held responsible by voters on all manners of 
political outcomes, from healthcare to the economy to education, they have strong electoral incen-
tives to try to control as much of the public policy generation and its outcomes as possible in order 
to appease voters expectations (Lewis, 2011). Political appointments are a way to try to exert such 
control over agencies and programs and produce the outcomes that politicians want, and voters ex-
pect (Lewis, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 2004:3,7; Moynihan & Roberts 2010:579).  
Appointments to the civil service bureaucracy is a legitimate part of governing a modern democracy, 
however, the model of the modern state has been to shield the bureaucracy from too much political 
influence in order to ensure its efficiency and impartiality (Peters & Pierre, 2004; Rouban, 2012). 
Peters and Pierre (2004) claim that having politicization effect the entire careers of bureaucrats, is a 
much larger departure from the model of protecting the bureaucracy from politics than the substitu-
tion of only very senior bureaucrats as a result of electoral turnover. If political criteria guide entire 
careers, this will shape the norms of the bureaucracy and its relationship to politics to a larger extent 
and such systems will be more politicized than systems where the political criteria is used less fre-
quently (Peters & Pierre, 2004:3).  
 
Populism and Politicization of the Bureaucracy  
Why would populists politicize more than others? In this section I will present the main arguments 
why they would. In short, populists are expected to increase politization because they embrace ma-
joritarian democracy and believe that the volonté générale should have complete influence over the state 
and its administration. Populists are antagonistic towards the elite and see the state and its bureau-
cracy as part of establishment and as a tool of the elite. The populist instinct to take full control of 
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the state may be reinforced by their enmity towards the institutions of the elite and the bureaucracy’s 
attempts to uphold pluralistic constraints on their power.  
 
Populism and the Pluralistic Bureaucracy  
Populism embraces majoritarian democracy which emphasize the implementation of the will of the 
majority, favours direct forms of government, embraces the idea of popular sovereignty, is critical of 
attempts to constrain the exercise of power and finds alien the idea that the majority should be limited 
by the rights of the minority (Plattner, 2010; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Populism is con-
trasted by its opposite, pluralism (Mudde, 2004:543), which regards society as heterogenous, made 
up by a variety of different groups and interests. In contrast to populism, pluralism is connected to 
the notion of liberal democracy rather than majoritarianism. Unlike populism, pluralism regards di-
versity as a strength rather than a weakness and opposite to the populist idea of a unconstrained 
volonté générale, the pluralist ideal is a system of compromise and restrictions where no one group can 
ever impose their will on others (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017:7-8).  
The modern democratic state shares the values of pluralism rather than those of populism, and it is 
the bureaucracy that upholds the state’s pluralistic ideals. The bureaucracy is in many ways a pluralist 
institution, bound by institutional restraints and made to uphold pluralistic ideals like impartiality, 
respect for minority rights and to exercise constitutional constraints in the day-to-day running of the 
state (Bauer & Becker, 2020). The bureaucracy’s pluralistic ideals and the idea that some parts of the 
state, such as the judiciary, central bank or the bureaucracy are to be kept from democratic influence 
and control puts the bureaucracy at odds with populism. This is because these ideals are not in line 
with the core populist ideology and understanding of democracy (Mudde, 2004:561; Müller, 2016:45) 
Populists believe that they, as the representatives of the people and the popular will, have the right 
to control all aspects of the state. They believe popular sovereignty to be the only legitimate source 
of power (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013:151). What matters to populists is that the people hold 
power, not the procedures or how power is exercised (Urbinati, 2019:122-3). Austrian populist leader 
Jörg Haider’s response to why he refused to comply with a court ruling regarding minority rights 
illustrates this point quite clearly, “- In a democracy, it is the will of the people that matters’, not that 
of the courts” (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013:351). As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) writes: “As 
[ populism] tends to distrust any unelected institution that limits the power of the demos, populism 
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can develop into a form of democratic extremism or better said, of illiberal democracy”. (2017:82, 
italics original). 
The populist focus on popular sovereignty means that populists do not share the pluralistic idea that 
the bureaucracy should be shielded from political control, rather they believe in increasing the level 
of political control over it. Further, as populist do not agree with the pluralistic ideals that guides the 
bureaucracy they will try to purge it from its pluralism and encourage “democratic recruitment”, a 
popular takeover of positions in the bureaucracy and reforming the state to allow them to govern as 
they please (Peters & Pierre, 2019:1534; Bauer & Becker, 2020:21; Müller, 2016:44,67). This has been 
described as the populist will to occupy or capture the state (Bauer & Becker, 2020:21; Müller, 
2016:44, 67). 
The idea of populist state capture has been borne out in a number of countries such as Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Peru, Hungary and Poland where populist governments have made efforts to change their 
countries constitutions, politicized the judiciary, eroded horizontal accountability and changed their 
civil service laws in order to strengthen their own control and limit the power the perceived elite 
(Levitsky & Loxton, 2013; Ruth, 2018; Hubert & Schimpf, 2016; Houle & Kenny, 2018; Bánkuti et 
al., 2012; Meyer-Sahling & Jager, 2012; Bauer & Becker, 2020; Mudde, 2019:128; Müller, 2016:45; 
Pappas, 2019; Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013) 
The populist instinct to take control of the state and politicize the administration may be reinforced 
by the nature and actions of the bureaucracy (Peters & Pierre, 2019:1533-6). Populists may regard a 
pluralistic bureaucracy as unresponsive to legitimate public demands and as an instrument to uphold 
the establishment status quo. Populists see themselves as the interpreters of the popular will and 
expect its full implementation (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013:348-
9), which is why a populist government is likely to find itself frustrated when faced with a slow-
moving, principal-abiding bureaucracy and expectations about swift reforms and the realization of 
their policies are not meet. The bureaucracy on the other hand may be resistant to comply with orders 
that run counter to its pluralist ideals. The opposition posed by the US administrative state to the 
attempts of populist state control from President Trump denotes that this is a likely response from 
the bureaucracy (Bauer & Becker, 2020:26-7). 
Such resistance has had Trump and other populists embrace the idea of the “deep state”, a shadowy 
expression of unelected establishment-bureaucrats with their own agenda acting on behalf of the 
elites rather than the people (Peters & Pierre, 2019; Bauer & Becker, 2020; Michaels, 2017; CNN, 
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2019). Opposition to their ideas is likely to reinforce the populist animosity towards the bureaucracy 
and the populist response may be to try to increase their control over the bureaucracy by politicizing 
it even further. 
 
Politicization in Practice  
This section presents theoretical arguments as well as examples of how politicization can and has 
occurred. Politicization is often a means to achieve control of the state administration but can, as we 
will see, also be used to sabotage the influences of one’s political opponents.  
According to Peters and Pierre (2004) increased politicization can be expected when there are large 
shifts in the nature of the policies of the state. As long as parties with similar ideologies and goals 
control the government, there is less of a need to politicize as policies and norms are similar. But 
when a different kind of political actor with fundamentally different views comes to power, they may 
use more extensive politicization in order to change the direction of public policy and reshape the 
bureaucracy (Peters & Pierre, 2004:8). Ideological differences between the bureaucracy and the gov-
erning party has been used to explain increased politicization by others as well, when there are ideo-
logical differences and lack of trust between government and administration, the incentives to polit-
icize increases (Dickinson & Rudalevige, 2004; Moynihan & Roberts 2010; Lewis, 2008; Peters & 
Pierre, 2019:1528). In line with Peters and Pierre’s (2004) reasoning, Luc Rouban (2004, 2007) has 
argued that the level of politicization of the French bureaucracy increased when the Socialists won 
the precedency in 1981. The new Socialist government represented a large shift and saw the incum-
bent bureaucracy as occupied by the upper-classes and sought to transform it with party loyalist to 
make it more accepting towards their policies (Rouban, 2004:86, 2007:490).  
As populist in general see the bureaucracy and its members as part of the establishment and as devices 
for maintaining the interests of the corrupt elite it can be expected that the conflict stemming from 
the ideological differences between populists and the bureaucracy should lead to a similar increase in 
politicization. Populists associate the bureaucracy with previous rulers and the societal elites as it has 
been implementing their policies and are assumed to support them. Who populists consider the elites 
can, as mentioned, vary depending on the breed of populism, but the members of the bureaucracy 
will often be included as they are largely made up by educated people in the national or regional 
capitals with proximity to political power (Bauer & Becker, 2020:22). The East-coast or Washington-
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elites of the US and the graduates of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration whom have occupied the 
higher ranks of the French civil service are examples of the bureaucracy being associated with the 
elite (Peters & Pierre, 2019:1529 ; Rouban, 2004). Peters & Pierre (2019) have argued that the bu-
reaucracy’s association with the elite can make populists unrusting of it, leading them to take measures 
to fill the bureaucracy with as many loyalists as possible (2019:1528).  
Populists can be expected to represent fundamental change when they come into power, they are 
political outsiders, anti-establishment and their ideas of governance runs counter to the pluralistic 
state and the ideals bureaucrats are used to abide by (Bauer & Becker, 2020). Their policies also differ 
fundamentally from those of traditional parties and they will want to exert their control in order to 
turn the ship of government. The ascent of Prime Minister Orbán’s populist Fidesz party to power 
in Hungary represented a remarkable shift from “business as usual” when they came into office for 
the second time in 2010 and their actions bare out Peter and Pierre’s predictions that large shifts in 
in the political leadership would be accompanied by increased politicization. The party have under-
taken an ambitious populist reform agenda accompanied by an extensive politicization of the public 
bureaucracy in order to facilitate the redirection of state policy (Mudde, 2019:126-7; Bauer & Becker, 
2020; Hajnal & Csengodi, 2014; Müller, 2016:44). The Hungarian populist government has been able 
to use politicization to increase their control, but it can also be used to reduce the influence of the 
perceived elite.  
Bauer and Becker (2020) argue that, as US President Trump’s attempts of populist reform and dis-
mantling of the American bureaucratic state to a large degree has been resisted, he has resorted to 
sabotage (2020:26-7). According to the authors, the combination of strong resistance from a stable 
institutional and political system and Trump’s anti-state, small government-ideology has had him 
using politicization to stop the pluralistic bureaucracy from working efficiently. Examples of this 
behaviour involve appointing a global warming sceptic as the head of the Environmental Protection 
Bureau and leaving many important positions in the government unfiled (Bauer & Becker, 2020:27). 
This can be seen as an attack on the pluralistic bureaucracy aimed at reducing the influence of the 
elite rather than directly furthering the president’s own control. So, populists may also use politiciza-
tion in order to diminish the influence and sabotage the agenda of their perceived enemies rather 
than just to further their direct interests.  
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Host Ideology  
Huber and Schimpf (2017) have argued that what they call the host ideology of populist parties, i.e. their 
ideological leanings besides populism, needs to be taken in to account when trying to understand 
their behaviour and their actions. In this section I draw on the debate on the different properties of 
different kinds of populism and present my expectations about the effect host ideology may have on 
politicization. So far, studies that explore the effects of populist rule on the state administration in 
general have been rare (Peters & Pierre, 2019:1524-5) and even less is known about potentially dif-
ferent effects of populist’s host ideologies.  
There has for some time existed a debate among students of populism who have focused on the 
relationship between populism and democracy. This debate has been about whether populism is pri-
marily an inclusionary force whose goal it is to increase the level and equality of political participation 
or an exclusionary force aimed at safeguarding influence for the “real people” while excluding others, 
such as immigrants (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Huber & Ruth, 2017). Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2013) have argued that populism can be both, depending on their host ideology. The 
authors maintain that inclusionary populism has been predominant among the far-left populists of 
Latin America, such as Chávez in Venezuela, while the, often nativist, radical right populists of Eu-
rope, like Le Pen in France embrace an exclusionary type of populism.  
Adding to this debate Ruth-Lovell et al. (2019) have contend that the two sorts of populism may 
affect different aspects of democracy. Left-wing inclusionary populism was suggested to increase the 
equal distribution of rights, participation and resources among different segments of the population 
while exclusionary far-right populism would further the negative impact of populism on public dis-
course and increase polarization (2019:5). However, when Ruth-Lovell et al. (2019) tested this claim, 
they found no difference between how far-left and far-right populists affect the quality of different 
models of democracy.  
What does this mean for politization? Well, there are reasons to believe that the ideological and in-
clusionary/exclusionary nature of the host ideology may affect how populists relate to the bureau-
cracy when in power. The more inclusionary left-wing populists value the participatory element of 
democracy even higher than other populists. Mass participation is their democratic ideal and demo-
cratic control of the entire state is incumbent in their populist-DNA. These populists will want to 
open all aspects of the state to previously un-represented groups and substitute the elites that has 
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previously occupied them (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013:162). This includes not just the minis-
tries and legislatures but also the state bureaucracy which should represent the entire people. Like the 
proponents of the “spoils system” in the US (Peters, 2004:123), they believe that politicization is a 
form of democratic control that keeps the government responsive to the people. This is true for 
populists in general but can be expected to be even more prevalent among left-wing populists and 
particularly with the radical far-left populists of Latin America that emphasises participation and be-
lieves in “radical democracy” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013:161).  
An example of far-left populism like this is the Chávez-Maduro regime’s in Venezuela. Even though 
their commitment to democracy has proven unsatisfactory, their partiality towards participation has 
led to several large-scale initiatives aimed at setting up participatory institutions that draw on other-
wise marginalised groups, tasked with administering services such as healthcare and education (Haw-
kins, 2010:60,35-40).  
I expect that the inclusionary ideal that led to efforts to engage new people in social programs also 
acts to increase politicization of the bureaucracy as more emphasis is put on democratic recruitment 
- getting unrepresented groups into positions in the state administration. This leads to the expectation 
that left-wing populists will be more inclined to politicize than both centrist and right-wing populists 
who do not share this inclusionary streak.  
 
Research Problem 
The previous sections have shown that populism is one of the most important political concepts 
today and that despite a lot of scholarly attention there is still not much known about how populists 
govern, particularly their relationship to the bureaucracy. I have argued why populists in power are 
likely to increase politicization more than non-populists and why far-left populists are even more 
likely than other populists to increase politicization. The aim of this study is to contribute to the 
research on populism by exploring it relationship to the bureaucracy in a quantitative study. Given 
the global rise of populist actors and what is known about the negative relationship between intense 
politicization and the quality of government, it is important to examine whether populists in power 
increase politicisation more than others.  
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Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical argument in the previous section I expect that: 
 Hypothesis 1: Populist governments increase the level of politicization more than non-
populist ones. 
 Hypothesis 2: Far-left populist governments increase politicization more than other popu-
lists.  
 
Methods and Data 
The empirical analysis takes a quantitative time-series cross-sectional approach in order to go beyond 
what has already been done in the field. In the past, studies on populism, which has to a large degree 
focused the emergence of populist actors and their effects on aspects of democracy, have often been 
limited to individual countries or groups of countries (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013; Houle & Kenny, 
2018; Ruth, 2018; Pappas, 2019). This includes the few efforts made to detangle populism’s relation-
ship to the bureaucracy (Bauer & Becker, 2020). Here, the aim is to go beyond these intra-regional 
approaches and bridge the gap that has existed in much of the previous studies of populism between 
students of Latin America and Europe, two regions where quite different manifestations of populism 
has been prevalent (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Rooduijn, 2014). This is done by conducting 
a cross-regional large-N analysis studying the effect of populist rule over time in both regions. Next, 
I will present the data used before describing the statistical techniques used in the analysis. Summary 
statistics of all variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix.  
 
Operationalizations  
Politicization – Merit Criteria 
The dependent variable politicization is operationalized using expert survey data from the Varieties 
of democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2020). V-Dem uses country experts to produce data 
on a range of topics relating to democracy and governance, their data is held in high regard and is 
widely used. The indicator used here is the variable “Criteria for appointment decisions in the state 
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administration1” (Pemstein et al., 2020) which measures to what extent appointment decisions in the 
state administration are based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit. 
Lower values of the variable indicate more politicization and higher values indicate less, i.e. that merit 
is more prevalent as a criterion for appointments (the survey question and possible responses can be 
found in Table A2 in the appendix). The indicator captures the de facto level of politicization as 
assessed by country experts rather than formal rules or policies. This is an advantageous way of 
measuring politicization as enforcement of formal rules may vary between countries as well as in 
countries across time. The meaning of politicization captured by this variable very closely matches 
Peters and Pierre’s (2004) definition of the concept which I use here. The variable describes the use 
of political criteria across the entire state bureaucracy rather than just the top level, which, as discussed 
in the methods section, is a better indicator of the level of politicization of the bureaucracy than the 
methods by which very senior officials are selected.  
 
Populism – Populist Rule 
Previously, the study of populism across regions have been difficult due to the lack of consensus 
about which political actors should be considered populist and the lack of systematic data collection. 
Here I am able to move beyond these difficulties by utilizing a newly developed dataset on populists 
in power in Europe and Latin America. It was developed by Saskia P. Ruth-Lovel, Anna Lührmann 
and Sandra Grahn (2019) and combines data from three different datasets and identifies when pop-
ulists have been in power. The data for Latin America comes from Ruth (2018) and identifies presi-
dents that came to power using a populist discourse by using literary review and expert opinion 
methods. The European coding uses The PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019) which identifies populist 
                                                     
1 The variable was first included in V-Dem version 9 (2019). There are some differences in the scores of some countries 
between this first version and version 10 (2020) which is used here.  For instance, in v.9 Hungary has a score of 1.68 for 
the year 2018, in v.10 the nations score for 2018 is -0.15 and Peru’s 2018 score changes from 0.3 in v.9 to 0.013 in v.10. 
For most countries, the differences are negligible. According to V-Dem, differences between versions can be due to them 
having included additional coders and/or coders may have changed their ratings based on new information. Here I use 
the latest version (v.10) of the dataset as this presumably is the best version according to the creators of the dataset. Re-
running the analysis using v.9 shows similar results for my main analysis.  
 
  17 
parties in a number of European countries, this is then combined with data on when representatives 
of these parties were in power (Huber & Schimpf, 2016, 2017; Hubert & Ruth, 2017). The result is a 
dataset on populists in power that covers 462 countries between 1994 and 2018, the sample includes 
282 separate tenures and identifies 28 populist and 239 non-populist individual presidents or prime 
ministers. In the dataset populism is a dichotomous variable indicating a populist chief executive, i.e. 
prime minister or president.  
 
Host Ideology 
All governments are also coded by ideology as being either far-left, centrist or far-right. The coding 
for Europe comes from the same source as the populist coding, Rooduijn et al. (2019) and classifies 
parties as far-right if they are nativist and authoritarian, and far-left if they have a radical left-wing 
economic policy. As Ruth’s (2018) dataset on populist presidents in Latin America do not contain 
classifications of leader’s host ideology, Ruth-Lovel et al. (2019) supplement the coding of ideology 
using a dataset by Murillo et al. (2010). This dataset classifies the ideology of Latin American presi-
dents based on the economic policies they implement in office. Parties and leaders not classified as 
either far-left- nor right are coded as centrist, a broad category including moderate parties on both 
the left and the right as well as centrists and non-ideological parties. For instance, Nicaragua’s Sandi-
nista President Daniel Ortega is coded as centre-populist while Hugo Chávez in Venezuela is con-
sidered a far-left populist and President Salvador Sánchez Cerén of El Salvador is coded as far-left 
non-populist.  
 
Control Variables  
In order to capture the effect of populist in power on the level of politicization, I apply a number of 
control variables. These are based on the theoretical expectations and can be expected to effect both 
the presence of a populist government and the level of politicization.  
                                                     
2 Ruth-Lovel et al.’s study covers 47 countries, but their data covers a total of 48 countries. I include the additional country 
(Croatia) but exclude Iceland and Malta due to incompatibility with other variables used in the empirical analysis. See 
Table A3 in the appendix for full list of countries.  
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Previous studies that have studied the populist effect on democratic quality has found that democratic 
consolidation can moderate the negative effect of populists in power on democratic quality (Huber 
& Schimpf, 2016). Less consolidated democracies are also more likely to have successful populists 
(Huber & Schimpf, 2016:164). I expect that the more consolidated democratic institutions will be 
more resilient to attempts at politicization as the pluralistic institutions and norm of shielding the 
bureaucracy from political influence are more intrenched than otherwise. To control for the level of 
democratic consolidation I use data from Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2019) on the number of years 
since the last regime change.  
Economic prosperity of a country can be expected to affect the affluence of populist parties and is 
known to affect governance and the level of democracy, so I expect it to also affect the level of 
politicization. In order to control for the effect of economic prosperity I include an indicator of GDP 
per capita (in 2010 USD, logged) from the World Bank’s development data (2020). 
I also include a variable on region, Latin America, or Europe, as there are quite large differences 
between the two regions on the average level of politicization (Kopecký et al., 2016). The control for 
region may also capture institutional differences between the mainly parliamentary Europe and the 
Latin American presidential systems.  
The ability of populist to implement changes that increase politicization can be expected to be con-
tingent on the level of control of the government. David E. Lewis’s (2008) works on the politicization 
of presidential appointments in the US has found that when the same party controls both the presi-
dency and congress, the increase in politicization is larger than otherwise. According to the author, 
this is because when the interests of the two branches are aligned there is less resistance to politici-
zation. Presidents who govern in face of an opposition-controlled congress on the other side, are 
more likely to have their appointments or requests to expand the number of appointees shot down. 
Although there are some debate on how party control of government effects politicization in differ-
ent types of political systems (see Rouban, 2007:491; Dahlström & Niklasson, 2013:894-5) the ex-
pectation here is that parties with less control of the government will have a harder time making large 
institutional changes that facilitate politicization than those leading majority governments.  
I expect that since populists wants to take full control of the state, they will try to politicize the 
bureaucracy if they can. These attempts will be resisted by the opposition which do not share the 
same ideals and wants to uphold the pluralistic state. Populists who do not control both the executive 
and legislature will therefore have a harder time politicizing the bureaucracy while those in control of 
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both will see no reason to limit their control of the state. To account for this, I include a control for 
divided government in the analysis. The variable used comes from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2020) 
and is called the Divided party control index and captures whether the same party or coalition con-
trols both the executive and the legislature. Lower values signify unified control, higher values divided 
control while coalitions make up the middle range.  
 
Methods 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to study the effect of populist rule on the level of politicization 
across time using a sample of Latin American and European countries. The main analysis uses pooled 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Beck & Katz, 
1995) and include a lagged (t-1) version of the dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable is 
used because the level of politization in a country for any given year is expected to be strongly influ-
enced by the value the previous year (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017:253-4). This dynamic model 
means that the results can be interpreted as the yearly change in the dependent variable. OLS with 
PCSE is a method designed specially to deal with the kind of data used here; time-series cross-sec-
tional (TSCS) data, i.e. data where the same units are observed at several points in time. The method 
is a standard way of analysing time-series-cross section data and suitable for my analysis as I expect 
variation in my independent and dependent variable both within countries over time but also between 
countries.  
An alternative approach would be to use a fixed-effect model, but these are not suitable in my case 
as they remove the variation between countries and only test within country-effects. There is relatively 
little variation on my main independent variable Populist rule, as there are relatively few cases of 
populists in power. This means that it is important to choose a method of analysis that utilizes this 
variation as much as possible. Also, my research question is based on the expectation that there are 
differences between countries. A PCSE model can handle this while a fixed-effects model would re-
move the between-country variation and therefore weaken the explanatory power of the model.  
The more conservative fixed-effects approach is instead used as a robustness test to see if the results 
hold up when controlling for within country effects. So, after the initial analysis, the models are re-
run using an alternative fixed-effects (within) regression with country clustered standard errors to test 
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the robustness of the results of the OLS regression. The next section presents the results of the 
empirical analysis and the results are then discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Results 
The results of the empirical analysis can be seen in Table 1 and 2, the models in Table 1 tests the 
effect of populists rule on the level of politicization (Hypothesis 1) while the regression in Table 2 
tests the direct effect of different host ideologies of populists in power (Hypothesis 2). As higher 
values of the dependent variable indicate less politicization the variable is referred to as Merit criteria 
in the tables to ease interpretation. The coefficient should be interpreted as the yearly change in the 
Merit criteria variable on populist rule. The same controls are applied for both analyses and are de-
scribed above. Next, I will first review the results in Table 1 before moving on to Table 2. The 
implications of the results are discussed in the next chapter. 
TABLE 1. POPULIST RULE AND POLITICIZATION – MAIN ANALYSIS 
 
Ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard-errors in parentheses.  
      * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Reference for Region is Europe 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) 
Merit criteria       
      
Populist rule -0.0541*** -0.0542*** -0.0543*** -0.0543*** -0.0532** 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0166) 
      
Merit criteria (t-1) 0.995*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 
 (0.00325) (0.00635) (0.00636) (0.00630) (0.00633) 
      
GDP/capita (log)  0.00490 0.00472 0.00525 -0.000263 
  (0.00662) (0.00654) (0.00662) (0.00898) 
      
Divided party control   -0.00309 -0.00308 -0.00220 
   (0.00371) (0.00370) (0.00357) 
      
Dem. Consolidation    -0.0000472 0.00000966 
    (0.000113) (0.0000902) 
      
      
Region     -0.0153 
     (0.0174) 
      
Constant 0.00977 -0.0328 -0.0307 -0.0344 0.0223 
 (0.00761) (0.0581) (0.0573) (0.0572) (0.0871) 
N 1129 1129 1129 1129 1129 
Countries 46 46 46 46 46 
Years (avg.) 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 
𝑅2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
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Table 1 shows the effect of the main independent variable Populist rule, meaning that there is a 
populist president or prime minister in power, the reference category for this variable is non-populist 
ruler. The control variables enter the analysis one by one and the full model can be seen to the far 
right (5a). None of the controls are statistically significant. The inclusion of a lagged (t-1) version of 
the dependent variable Merit criteria explains the considerably large R-squared value of all models in 
Table 1. This is because the inclusion of the value of the dependent variable from the previous year 
gives the model a lot of predictive power. The results in Table 1 show that the coefficient for Populist 
rule is negative, suggesting that populist rule increases the level of politicization and decrease the 
prevalence of the merit criteria. The effect is statistically significant and in line with expectations.  
The effect of populist rule in the full model (5a) is, however, not very big, only about a twentieth 
standard deviation. As an example, Denmark which has the highest value on the variable in the sam-
ple scores 2.987 for each year in the time-series. A yearly change of -0.0532 as predicted by the results 
would change Denmark’s score to 2.455 over 10 years, a score which would still be the fourth highest 
average in the sample. The same ten-year effect of a -0.532 change can also be express as the differ-
ence between Sweden’s average value during the time-series and that of Poland before the onset of 
the current populist regime. Even if this is not a radical change it would still have an impact on how 
the bureaucracy functions and over time the norms of a political system may change and the balance 
between merit and politics be altered.  
The analysis seen in Table 2 tests the direct effect of far-left, centrists and far-right populist rule. 
Again, the centrist category is broad and encompasses all populists not considered far-left- or right, 
including such diverse political figures as Silvio Berlusconi and Daniel Ortega. There are quite few 
populist rulers in the sample who fall into the extreme categories, during the time period observed 
four countries had far-left populist leaders and only three had far-right populist leaders (see Appendix 
for list of countries). The expectation that the more inclusionary far-left populists increase politiciza-
tion more than far-right and centrist populists is not supported by the results. They show negative 
coefficients for all three types of populists, but the results are only significant for the two extremes. 
The size of the effect of far-left populists in power is slightly larger than the general populist variable 
seen in Table 1 while the effect of far-right populism is almost three times as large. This suggests that 
it is the two extremes and particularly far-right populism that is driving the effect observed in Table 
1.  
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The effect of far-right populists in power is quite substantial compared to the results in Table 1, about 
one seventh of a standard deviation. The annual change predicted would have Sweden at the level of 
Costa Rica in five years and that of South Africa after 10 years. Again, when observing the results of 
Model 2 it is important to remember that there are few observations for each type of populist host 
ideology and that the inclusion of a lagged version of the dependent variable effects the R-square 
value. 
TABLE 2. POPULIST RULE AND POLITICIZATION – BY HOST IDEOLOGY  
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 
Merit criteria      
      
Far-left Populist rule -0.0682* -0.0695** -0.0688* -0.0687* -0.0642* 
 (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0262) 
      
Centrist Populist rule -0.00177 -0.000499 -0.000928 -0.00100 -0.00102 
 (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0183) 
      
Far-right Populist rule -0.146** -0.146** -0.146** -0.147** -0.149** 
 (0.0563) (0.0560) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0554) 
      
Merit criteria (t-1) 0.995*** 0.990*** 0.990*** 0.991*** 0.990*** 
 (0.00355) (0.00660) (0.00661) (0.00656) (0.00661) 
      
GDP/capita (log)  0.00651 0.00638 0.00710 0.00147 
  (0.00658) (0.00649) (0.00649) (0.00892) 
      
Divided party control   -0.00170 -0.00169 -0.000916 
   (0.00376) (0.00376) (0.00375) 
      
Dem. Consolidation    -0.0000646 -0.00000874 
    (0.000103) (0.0000836) 
      
      
Region     -0.0155 
     (0.0167) 
      
Constant 0.00769 -0.0488 -0.0475 -0.0526 0.00523 
 (0.00796) (0.0578) (0.0569) (0.0562) (0.0869) 
N 1129 1129 1129 1129 1129 
Countries 46 46 46 46 46 
Years (avg.) 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 
𝑅2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard-errors in parentheses.  
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Reference for Region is Europe 
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TABLE 3. POPULIST RULE AND POLITICIZATION - ROBUSTNESS CHECK WITH ALTERNATIVE MOD-
ELS  
Merit criteria (1c) (2c) 
   
Populist rule -0.283*  
 (0.136)  
   
Far-left Populist rule  -0.367 
  (0.335) 
   
Centrist Populist rule  0.0797 
  (0.141) 
   
Far-right Populist rule  -0.691* 
  (0.327) 
   
GDP/capita (log) 0.264 0.242 
 (0.284) (0.276) 
   
Divided party control  -0.0275 -0.0155 
 (0.0426) (0.0355) 
   
Dem. consolidation 0.00133 0.00213 
 (0.00665) (0.00613) 
   
Constant  -1.487 -1.318 
 (2.532) (2.486) 
N 1129 1129 
Countries 46 46 
Years (avg.) 24.5 24.5 
𝑅2 (within) 0.0882 0.143 
Fixed-effects regression with clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Robustness Check  
In order to test the robustness of the results the models are re-run using an alternative fixed-effects 
regression with standard errors clustered by country. The results can be seen in Table 3. The controls 
are the same as in the main analysis except for Region, which is excluded as only variables that vary 
over time should be included in fixed-effects regressions. Also, the fixed-effects models do not in-
clude the lagged version of the dependent variable, this in order to avoid potential bias (Nickell, 
1981).  
Model 1c in Table 3 uses the same general Populist rule variable as in Table 1 while Model 2c tests 
the direct effect of different kinds of populism just as the regression in Table 2. The results of Model 
1c confirm those of the main analysis, again having a populist president or prime minister is predicted 
to increase the level of politicization. The effect, however, is larger than the general effect seen in 
Table 1 and the effects of far-right populist rule in Table 2. The effects reported in Model 2c are also 
larger than in the main analysis, but the most important difference is that here, it is only the effect of 
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far-right populism that is statistically significant, not far-left populism. Overall the robustness test is 
in line with the findings of the main analysis, populist governments seem to increase the level of 
politicization more than non-populists and the direct effect of far-right populist rule seem to be 
stronger than that of other populists in power. 
 
Discussion of the Results  
In this section I discuss the results of the empirical analysis and their implications. The results of the 
main analysis suggest that there is a positive effect of populist rule on the level politicization, giving 
credence to the hypothesis that populists are more inclined than others to politicize the bureaucracy. 
The observed yearly effect is however, as noted in the previous section, not very large. The cumulative 
effect, however, is not negligible and over time the norms of the bureaucracy and the ideal of isolating 
the bureaucracy from politics may be eroded. This may lead to shift towards more political control 
and influence over the bureaucracy. This study has not examined to what extent the level of politici-
zation returns to normal after populists leave office, but once norms have been changed they may be 
hard to change back as the general trend seems to be towards more politicization rather than less 
(Peters & Pierre, 2004:6).  
The fact that the effect exists but is relatively small suggests that it could be that the populist instinct 
to politicize exists, but the ability of populists to implement large changes is hindered. This may be 
because populists are often political outsiders without previous experience of governance, claiming 
to represent the people and often making a point of not being part of the traditional party elite. For 
example, Peru’s Alberto Fujimori had no political experience before seeking the presidency, Hugo 
Chavéz first became known to the public as one of the leaders of a failed coup d'etat, Silvio Berlusconi 
was a media-mogul and Donald Trump was a businessman and reality TV host. Peters and Pierre 
(2019) have argued that outsider populists often lack the necessary skills and experience to take on 
the institutions that they want to change once in power (2019:1527). The bureaucracy, and the state 
at large, often have strong pluralistic institutions that are likely to resist populists attempts at reform 
and without an organised strategy to take on these institutions, populist governments may struggle 
to achieve the changes they strive for.  
Similarly, Levitsky and Loxton (2013) have also argued that since populist are often outsiders, they 
lack the experience to build coalitions, negotiate, manoeuvre the political system and may also lack 
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the perseverance necessary to implement their policies (2013:110-11). Institutional experience may 
help explain why the change in the level of politicization is relatively small; some populists may at-
tempt to change the bureaucracy and implement more majoritarian direct political control but lack 
the institutional know-how required to successfully carry it out.  
Not all populists are outsiders however, for instance when Victor Orbán took office in 2010 he had 
already served as prime minister once before and he and his party had been part of Hungarian politics 
for two decades. But then Hungary is an example where the populist government has transformed 
the civil service and where the level of politicization has increased, more on this below.  
The perceived need for politicization may differ depending on what norms are in place when popu-
lists come to power. The level of politicization may be less affected if it is already relatively high, an 
incoming populist government may be satisfied with the level of politization and see less need to 
increase it further. While for populists in less politicized countries where the pluralistic norms are 
stronger, the perceived need for change may be bigger. The data reveals large differences in the mean 
level of politicization between Latin American and European countries. The mean in the sample on 
the V-Dem Merit criteria variable is 1.53 for the Europe and 0.24 for the Latin America. If populists 
on both sides of the Atlantic have the same idea about what ideal level of politicization is, then 
Europeans may need to change the level of politicization in their countries more than their Latin 
American counterparts in order to reach this ideal level, leading to a more dramatic change.  
The ability of populists to implement changes that increase politicization may also be dependent on 
their level of popular support. Ruth (2018) found that in Latin America, when populist presidents 
came into conflict with the legislature over their attempts to erode horizontal constraints on their 
own power, popular support was the deciding factor on which their success or failure depended. 
Presidents who lacked support for their attempts to strengthen the presidency and their power over 
the legislature and judiciary would see their reforms stopped or even be impeached by the legislature. 
Similarly, populist who do not have popular support for their efforts to reshape the bureaucracy may 
be less successful as their efforts are more forcefully opposed by the political opposition as well as 
members of the bureaucracy who feel that they have the public on their side. In such a situation, 
populist actors may be able to place loyalists in some strategic places but be unable to achieve real 
institutional change.  
The second part of the analysis which focused on the direct effect of far-left, centrist and far-right 
populism showed that the two extremes and particularly far-right populism seem to drive the results. 
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The direct effects of these ideological leanings are considerably larger than the general effect and the 
predicted effect would lead to a rather dramatic change in the level of politicization.  
As mentioned in the Methods section, the data on the ideology of presidents and parties comes from 
different sources for Latin America and Europe, as the Ruth-Lovel et al.‘s (2019) dataset is the result 
of a combination of several existing datasets. Unfortunately, there is a discrepancy in the way ideology 
is treated in the different sources. The coding for Latin America by Murillo et al. (2010) is only based 
on economic policy where the far-left- and right categories are made up by political actors on the 
extremes of a left-right scale (see Ruth-Lovel et al., 2019:16). Conversely, the coding for Europe, 
which comes from Rooduijn et al. (2019), does not categorize the ideology of parties exclusively on 
their economic policy, rather far-right parties are coded as such if they are nativist and authoritarian, 
regardless of their economic policies. Economic policy does play a role for coding parties as far-left 
parties.  
This means that Panama’s President Mireya Moscoso is coded as far-right based only on her eco-
nomic policies while the classification of the Hungarian Fidesz and Polish PiS parties as the same is 
only based on them being nativist and authoritarian and the classification says nothing about their 
economic policies. Conceptually the Rooduijn et al. (2019) definition is the closest to the exclusionary 
right-wing politics described by Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) and hence more useful for the 
analysis. This mismatch of definitions is unfortunate and certainly weakens the part of the analysis 
that focuses on the direct effect of host ideology. It is possible that had the same criteria been used 
for both continents, the division by host ideologies would have been different. When I re-run the 
regression separating the sample by region, I find some contrasting results. The host ideology analysis 
shows that far-left- and right populism has about the same effect using the only European sample, 
but none of the two extremes are statistically significant at the 95% level using the Latin American 
sample (see Table A4 in the Appendix). There are many factors that differ between the two regions 
which may explain this outcome, but it is an indication that the inconsistency of the ideology coding 
may have affected the results.  
This is important to keep in mind when interpreting the results, as well as the fact that the analysis is 
based on a small number of observations as there are relatively few examples of fringe-populists in 
the sample. Only Hungary, Panama and Poland had far-right leaders during the time period with a 
total of 18 far-right populist country-years. While Bolivia, Ecuador, Greece, Peru and Venezuela had 
far-left populist leaders for a total of 50 years. This means that individual countries may influence the 
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results heavily, for instance, almost half the observations for far-right populism come from Hungary 
alone. In fact, looking at the individual scores of the countries it is obvious that it is Hungary and 
Poland that is driving the effect of far-right populism. The level of politicization in Panama, the third 
country to be coded as far-right populist in the sample, did not change at all during the five-year term 
of President Mireya Moscoso. The politicization levels are stable at the same value for the entire 25-
year time period. This is perhaps an indication that the discrepancies in the ideology coding are em-
pirically relevant.  
As for Hungary and Poland, they both start out at about the European average in the beginning of 
the time-series and both countries see rather dramatic changes as far-right populists come to power. 
Hungary scored 1.5 on the Merit criteria scale the year before the far-right populist Fidesz party came 
to power for the second time in 2010, slipped to 0.44 their first year in office and at the end of the 
time-series in 2018 the country sores -0.15. Poland underwent a similar decline from 1.44 to 0.142 
over the last 5 years of the time-series under the populist PiS-government. 
On the other side of the ideological spectrum there are also some interesting revelations to be found 
by taking a closer look at the individual country scores of the V-Dem data. Here the ideology coding 
is more consistent as both sources understand far-leftism in economic terms. Venezuela, starting out 
at about the same politicization value as Poland and Hungary under centrist populist Rafael Caldera 
in 1994, has seen a sharp increase in the level of politicization over the two decades of far-left populist 
rule. Starting in Hugo Chávez first year in office, the change has continued gradually over the next 
decades into Maduro’s presidency and in 2017 it reached -1.497, the lowest value of any country in 
the sample. In Greece, where politicization is traditionally commonplace, the far-left populist Syriza 
party’s first three years in office lead to a change from -0.032 to -0.782 on the Merit criteria variable.  
However, as for the rest of the far-left populists, the pattern does not continue. When Evo Morales 
first became president of Bolivia there was an initial change from 0.163 to 0.132 his first year in office, 
but after this small change the levels remained the same for the rest of the time-series. Both Ecuador 
and Peru have seen the level of politicization decrease under far-left populist leaders. The V-Dem 
data shows Peru becoming less politicized when the far-left populist Humala took over from the 
centrist populists Garcia and the presidency of Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, saw the level of politicization 
decrease, from -0.045 before he took office to 0.45 during his two terms as president. So, just as the 
effect on the far-right side can be attributed to Hungary and Poland, among the far-left populist 
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cases, it is only Greece and Venezuela that actually see an increase in the level of politicization under 
far-left populists. 
My expectations that far-left populists would politicize more than other populists because of their 
partiality to more participatory elements of democracy were not supported by the results. The results 
do, however, suggest that host ideology matters. The operationalization used here is quite a rough 
measurement of the inclusionary/exclusionary spectrum and has some problems due to the different 
criteria used for Latin America and Europe. Although it is primarily the far-left populists like Chávez 
and Morales that Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) base their analysis on, the operationalization of 
host ideology used here may exclude left-wing inclusionary populists in Latin America not considered 
far-left by the coding. As mentioned above, Nicaragua’s Ortega is coded as centrist rather than far-
left but as a leftist he and his government may still encompass an inclusionary type of populism. 
Ruth-Lovell et al. (2019) comment the fact that they did not find a moderating effect of host ideology 
on democracy by saying that the measurement might need to be more fine-grained in order to capture 
the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of populists. The same may be said here. This also means that the 
results for the centrist category should be treated with caution as it is such a diverse group, including 
many different types of political actors with little in common compared to the groups of fringe-
populists.  
The observed effect of the far-left and far-right populists calls for some attention, it is interesting 
that there is an effect on both extremes of the political spectrum but not at the middle. Of course, 
this may partly be due to the diversity of the centrist category. On the far-right side, the results seem 
to be driven by Poland and Hungary, two countries whose governing parties are categorised as far-
right because they are nativist and authoritarian and on the far-left side a lot of the variation comes 
from Venezuela, a country that has undergone a far-reaching process of autocratization since Hugo 
Chávez first came to power.  
This warrants the question whether intense politicization is mostly a feature of what Bert A Rockman 
(2019) calls populist authoritarianism, i.e. populist governments that use populism to legitimise their 
rule while undermining democratic institutions, rather than populism at large? Leaders with authori-
tarian leanings or full out authoritarian governments do not have to lead to more politicization, Sin-
gapore for instance, is a well-known example of an authoritarian country where meritocracy is well 
entrenched (Rockman, 2019:1562; Rothstein, 2011:203-5). Authoritarianism can however, act as an 
enabler of populist ambitions of institutional change. Authoritarian actors may weaken democratic 
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institutions and constraints on their own power, facilitating further politicization by enabling greater 
institutional change by undermining the pluralistic norms that resist politicization. The role of au-
thoritarian host ideologies is an interesting hypothesis to be explored further in the future. 
 
Conclusions 
The general findings of the analysis are that populists in power do seem to increase the level of 
politicization more than non-populists (Hypothesis 1). This effect was statistically significant and was 
borne out in the robustness test. However, the effect seems to be driven mainly by a few cases. 
Previously, not much has been known about the relationship between populists in power and the 
bureaucracy, this study has begun to fill this gap. The results of this study points in the expected 
direction and suggest that populists in power may increase the level of politicization and that over 
time populist rule may lead to a shift in the norms that govern the public bureaucracy.  
Considering that populism is on the rise in many countries across the world and what is known about 
the relationship between politicization and the quality of government these findings are important. 
Political control and accountability are a necessary part of democratic governance, but intense polit-
icization may damage the bureaucracy’s legitimacy and performance as well as the quality of govern-
ment.  
The expectation that populists who come into power will try to take control of the bureaucracy, 
politicize it and purge it from pluralist ideals implies a fast and dramatic process. However, the results 
seen here are more modest. The observed yearly effect is not very large and may not radically change 
a country’s relative level of politicization, at least not very fast. However, it can have an affect over 
time and as norms change the equilibrium between politics and merit may shift. Once changed, such 
a shift may prove hard to reverse. Therefore, the results warrant further attention to the quality of 
government implications of the current populist trend.  
The results for far-right populists, however, are more in line with the idea of a swift change. This can 
be seen in the second part of the analysis, studying the direct effect of far-left, centrist and far-right 
populist rule. These results indicate that the effect of populist rule is driven by populists on the fringes 
of the left-right spectrum, particularly the far-right. The analysis showed no significant effect of the 
largest of the groups of host ideology, the diverse centrist category. The expectation that the more 
inclusionary far-left populists would increase the level of politicization more than other populists 
  30 
(Hypothesis 2) was not supported by the results. Rather, the effect of far-right populism is stronger 
than that of far-left populism.  
The different effect of host ideologies is an interesting finding, even if the results should be treated 
with caution due to the lack of consistency of the coding and the relatively small number of obser-
vations. The findings do suggest however, that the role of host ideology is something that future 
studies could benefit from exploring. This would further the debate on inclusionary and exclusionary 
populism and their properties as well as shed more light on the role of populist authoritarianism in 
politicization.  
The aim of this paper has been to examine the notion that populist in power politicize the bureau-
cracy, which had been suggested but not tested in earlier works in the field. Using a combination of 
different data sources and a quantitative approach the study has been able to provide an empirical 
test and find support for the idea that populists in power do increase the level of politicization more 
than others. These findings are in line with the theory that populism’s majoritarian and anti-elite 
sentiments makes populist actors more inclined to use appointments to the bureaucracy as a means 
of control, in order to implement their agenda and to reduce pluralistic and “elite” influences on the 
state.  
As populisms seems to be here to stay, the indication that populists in power furthers politicization 
may be an important issue to explore for future studies. This paper’s quantitative analysis has begun 
to empirically establish a pattern. Future studies could gain by studying individual populist govern-
ments and why it seems only some populists politicize. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1. SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Observations Mean SD Min. Max. Source 
Politicization- Merit 
criteria  
1129     
 
1.035841  1.059039      
  
-1.497       2.987 Pemstein et 
al., 2019 
Populism 1129 .1231178      .328718    0 1 Ruth-Lovel et 
al., 2019 
Host ideology  1129 .2054916 .6104338 0 3 Ruth-Lovel et 
al., 2019 
GDP/cap (Log) 1129   9.52496     1.066184     6.969278     11.62597 World Bank, 
2020 
Divided Govern-
ment 
1129 .0685855     .8421876      -1.631       1.695 Coppedge et 
al., 2020 
Democratic conso-
lidation 
1129 33.26395     27.91399    0 138 Marshall et al., 
2019 
Region 1129 .3861825      .487089   0 1 Ruth-Lovel et 
al.., 2019 
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TABLE A2. EXERT FROM THE V-DEM CODEBOOK, POLITICIZATION- MERIT CRITERIA VARIABLE 
3.9.0.6 Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (C) (v2stcritrecadm) Project Manager(s): Agnes Cornell 
Additional versions: *_osp, *_ord, *_codelow, *_codehigh, *_sd, *_mean, *_nr 
Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal 
and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit? 
Clarification: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. 
Note that the question refers to the typical de facto (rather than de jure) situation 
obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences 
between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state 
administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question. 
Responses: 
0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political 
connections. None are based on skills and merit. 
1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political 
connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit. 
2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on 
personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit. 
3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or 
political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit. 
4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or 
political connections. All are based on skills and merit. 
Scale: Ordinal. 
Data release: 9-10. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology). 
Citation: Pemstein et al. (2019, V-Dem Working Paper Series 2019:21) 
Years: 1789-2019 
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TABLE A3. LIST OF COUNTRIES BY POPULIST HOST IDEOLOGY, COUNTRY-YEARS 
 
 
 
Country name Non-populist Far-left populism Centrist populism Far-right populism Total 
Argentina 16 0 9 0 25 
Austria 25 0 0 0 25 
Belgium 25 0 0 0 25 
Bolivia 13 12 0 0 25 
Brazil 25 0 0 0 25 
Bulgaria 13 0 12 0 25 
Chile 25 0 0 0 25 
Colombia 25 0 0 0 25 
Costa Rica 25 0 0 0 25 
Croatia 19 0 0 0 19 
Cyprus 25 0 0 0 25 
Czech Republic 24 0 1 
 
0 25 
Denmark 25 0 0 0 25 
Dominican Republic 21 0 4 0 25 
Ecuador 12 10 3 0 25 
El Salvador 25 0 0 0 25 
Estonia 23 0 2 0 25 
Finland 25 0 0 0 25 
France 25 0 0 0 25 
Germany 25 0 0 0 25 
Greece 22 3 0 0 25 
Guatemala 23 0 0 0 23 
Honduras 25 0 0 0 25 
Hungary 17 0 0 8 25 
Ireland 25 0 0 0 25 
Italy 16 0 9 0 25 
Latvia 22 0 3 0 0 
Lithuania 24 0 0 0 24 
Luxemburg 25 0 0 0 25 
Mexico 25 0 0 0 25 
Netherlands 25 0 0 0 25 
Nicaragua 13 0 12 0 25 
Norway 25 0 0 0 25 
Panama 20 0 0 5 25 
Paraguay 25 0 0 0 25 
Peru 3 5 5 0 13 
Poland 20 0 0 5 25 
Portugal 25 0 0 0 25 
Romania 25 0 0 0 25 
Slovakia 25 0 0 0 25 
Slovenia 25 0 0 0 25 
Spain 25 0 0 0 25 
Sweden 25 0 0 0 25 
United Kingdom 25 0 0 0 25 
Uruguay 25 0 0 0 25 
Venezuela 0 20 5 0 25 
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TABLE A4. POPULIST RULE AND POLITICIZATION - SEPARATE ANALYSIS BY REGION 
 (1-Europe) (2-Latin America) (3-Europe) (4-Latin America) 
Merit criteria     
     
Populist rule -0.0949** -0.0276+   
 (0.0344) (0.0152)   
     
Far-left Populist rule   -0.291* -0.0433+ 
   (0.140) (0.0241) 
     
Centrist Populist rule   -0.000563 -0.000480 
   (0.0328) (0.0196) 
     
Far-right Populist rule   -0.213*** 0.0109 
   (0.0627) (0.0101) 
     
     
Merit criteria (t-1) 0.986*** 0.995*** 0.983*** 0.991*** 
 (0.00929) (0.00794) (0.00955) (0.00790) 
     
GDP/capita (log) 0.00222 -0.00431 0.00873 -0.00127 
 (0.0130) (0.00894) (0.0128) (0.00888) 
     
Divided party control 0.00327 -0.00513 -0.0000779 -0.00371 
 (0.00876) (0.00389) (0.00890) (0.00414) 
     
Dem. Consolidation  -0.0000109 0.000106 -0.0000813 0.000181 
 (0.000112) (0.000216) (0.000112) (0.000218) 
     
     
Constant 0.00778 0.0337 -0.0521 0.00531 
 (0.123) (0.0796) (0.121) (0.0798) 
N 693 436 693 436 
Countries 28 18 28 18 
Years (avg.) 24.75 24.22 24.75 24.22 
𝑅2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard-errors in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
 
 
